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TRIBUTE

RESPECT FOR LAW AND MAN: THE TORT LAW
OF CHIEF JUSTICE FRANK ROWE KENISON
"The law,-it has honored us, may we honor it."
-Daniel Webster*
David G. Owen**

INTRODUCTION

The professional life of a state supreme court justice is generally a quiet one, distant from the rough and tumble political world
of the executive and legislative branches of government. Most people take little interest in the day-to-day work of such judges, deciding on cold records whether trial or intermediate appellate
judges properly applied the rules of law to resolve disputes, and
only occasionally tinkering with the rules themselves. So it is that
the role of many justices, even chief justices, is not long
remembered once they leave judicial office. Yet, from time to time,
a state will produce a supreme court justice whose service on the
court has a significant impact on the development of the common
law of the state and perhaps the nation. Chief Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. of Massachusetts 1 and Charles Doe of New Hampshire' so influenced the law during the late nineteenth century, as
did Chief Justices Benjamin Cardozo of New York$ during the
* Of the New Hampshire Bar, in a speech to the Charleston, South Carolina Bar, May
10, 1847. Daniel Webster was born, educated, practiced law and represented New Hampshire (and later represented Massachusetts) in the United States Congress.
** Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.S., 1967, J.D. 1971, University of
Pennsylvania. The author served as law clerk to Chief Justice Kenison in 1972-73. This
essay is derived from the inaugural Frank Rowe Kennison lecture delivered by the author at
the Franklin Pierce Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CH. L. REv. 213 (1964); Tushnet, The
Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REv.
975 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creationof Opinions by an Artist, 63 COLUM.
L. REV. 59 (1963); Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Reflections on a Nineteenth Century

Judge, 63 HAEv. L. REv. 513 (1950).

3. See, e.g., Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1939); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20 (1939).
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early part of this century and Roger Traynor of California' more
recently. So too will Chief Justice Frank Rowe Kenison of New
Hampshire be long remembered for his profound contribution to
the common law.5
There are a multitude of different windows through which the
significance of any judge's work may be assessed. Since tort law
spans as broad a spectrum of human activity as any other area of
the law, an analysis of a judge's torts opinions should shed much
light upon his basic attitude toward the proper role of law.
Thus I studied Justice Kenison's decisions on tort law,' decided from 19461 through 19778-a period of over thirty years.
From this study emerges a portrait of an exemplary supreme court
judge who served his people well. His method of analysis and writing style are forthright, honest, and clear." His opinions are thoroughly researched from a variety of legal sources both from within
the state to a large and eclectic range of sources from without-a
4. See, e.g., Malone, ContrastingImages of Torts-The JudicialPersonality of Justice
Traynor, 13 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1961); Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13
STAN. L. REV. 719 (1961).

5. Frank Rowe Kenison (1907-1980) was appointed Associate Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court on February 22, 1946, and Chief Justice on April 22, 1952, and served
in the latter until his retirement on November 1, 1977. Professor Robert A. Leflar, Director
of the N.Y.U. Law School Appellate Judges Seminars from 1956-77, and a former Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, has referred to "a few of America's greatest common law judges, including Holmes of Massachusetts, Cardozo of New York, Traynor of California, Kenison of New Hampshire, and Schaefer of Illinois." Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 721 (1979). See also Leflar, True "False Conflicts," Et Alia, 48 B.U.L.

REV. 164 (1968) ("one of the nation's outstanding judicial scholars"); J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES (2d ed. 1978),
Teachers' Manual 7-12 ("one of the great state supreme court judges"); Letter from Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger to Massachusetts Justice Paul C. Riordan, 1974 ("one of the foremost jurists in the country"). Chief Justice Burger and Kenison were co-faculty at the
N.Y.U. Law School Appellate Judges Seminar.
Boston University Law Review dedicated an issue (no. 2) to him in 1968, in which four
professors examined his contributions to various areas of the law. 48 B.U.L. REV. 159 (1968).
The 1970/71 volume of The Annual Survey of American Law was dedicated to Chief Justice
Kenison. He was Chairman of the Conference of the Chief Justices of the United States. For
his own contributions to the law reviews, see Kenison, Some PreliminaryObservations on
the State Appellate Judge Today, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 792 (1961); Kenison, By Way of Introduction, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 377 (1965).

6. Chief Justice Kenison wrote approximately fifty opinions that dealt principally with
the common-law tort principles.
7. His first tort law opinion, Copadis v. Haymond, 94 N.H. 103, 47 A.2d 120 (1946), was
a negligence case involving an intersectional collision of two automobiles.
8. His last tort law opinion, Paquette v. Joyce, 117 N.H. 832, 379 A.2d 207 (1977), involved an automobile that left the road and collided with the defendant's tree stump.
9. See generally Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 721, 727-29 (1979).
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characteristic that enriches the wisdom and authoritative quality
of his decisions. His opinions consistently appear to reach a just
and logical result, well explained, efficiently administered, and
based on traditional New England common sense. Yet there is another aspect of Justice Kenison's decisions, a constant theme woven silently throughout his opinions for more than thirty years,
that is perhaps their dominant characteristic: a respect for the
sources, purposes and limits of the law.
I.

RESPECTING THE SOURCES OF THE LAW

Judge Kenison respected the sources of the law. His tort opinions reflect a deep commitment to the right and duty of a democratic people to rule themselves, whether by constitution, legislation, common law, or tradition outside the law.
A respect for constitutional principle is evident in Judge
Kenison's decisions. In Belkner v. Preston,0 for example, the
plaintiff's decedent filed a tort action against the defendant in
Hillsborough County and then died. The plaintiff, the decedent's
mother and administratrix, moved to be substituted as the plaintiff
eleven months later, but confronted a statute giving the administrator in such a case a maximum of two terms of court within
which to seek substitution." Litigants in counties with 2 terms of
court per year thus had up to 12 months within which to seek substitution, whereas litigants in 3-term counties (such as Hillsborough) had at most 8 months. 12 Judge Kenison saw this form of discrimination against litigants in 3-term counties as having "no
rational relationship to the statutory purpose of providing for the
survival of pending tort actions," 3 and therefore violative of the
plaintiff's right to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiff
was accordingly allowed a full twelve months to file her motion for
substitution.
When Judge Kenison more typically upheld statutes against
constitutional attack, rather than showing disrespect for constitutional authority, he demonstrated a respect for the legislature's
broad responsibility under the constitution to enact statutes for
10.
11.
12.
13.

115 N.H.
Id. at 16,
Id. at 17,
Id. at 19,

15, 332 A.2d 168 (1975).
332 A.2d at 170.
332 A.2d at 170.
332 A.2d at 172.
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the public welfare. Thus, in two cases against constitutional challenge, he upheld statutes imposing strict liability on defendants for
certain risks-fires from railroads "4 and realty damage from wild
boars. 5 In the latter case, the Chief Justice remarked: "The police
power of the state to control matters which are or may be considered nuisances is extremely broad."1 6 Although the court had long
disfavored strict liability in tort, as discussed below,1 7 he reasoned
in the boar case that "we cannot say that the state is powerless to
adopt the view of absolute liability for damage by wild boar as a
legislative policy. The statute . . . is constitutional."' 8 Judge
Kenison thus respected the broad and fundamental power of the
elected assembly to enact legislation binding on the courts unless
offensive to constitutional principle.
In addition to a respect for constitutional and statutory law,
Judge Kenison's opinions show an abiding respect for New Hampshire common law-for the rule of precedent-even when he personally had some doubt as to the wisdom of the earlier doctrine. In
one of his early tort decisions, Owen v. Dubois,19 Associate Justice
Kenison demonstrated simultaneous respect for the common law
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the statutory law of the
New Hampshire legislature, and consequently for the separation of
powers principle of the New Hampshire Constitution. The defendant's truck struck Mr. Owen when he drove his vehicle from a private driveway onto a highway. In Mr. Owen's negligence suit
against the truck driver, the defendant asserted that he should
have had the right of way, urging the court to extend the right-ofway statute-which by its terms applied only to public ways-to
cover the case.20 Judge Kenison thought this was a "strong argument" based on common understanding:
It may well be doubtful if the average motorist realizes that
the automobile emerging from a private driveway has as great
a right as the one proceeding along a public highway. Both
speed and traffic on a public highway will be greater than
that on a private driveway and there is less opportunity for
motorists on a public highway to view those coming from ob14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

State v. Boston & M.R.R., 99 N.H. 66, 105 A.2d 751 (1954).
King v. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, 100 N.H. 212, 123 A.2d 151 (1956).
Id. at 218, 123 A.2d at 156.
See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
100 N.H. at 218, 123 A.2d at 156.
95 N.H. 444, 66 A.2d 80 (1949).
Id. at 445, 66 A.2d at 81.
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structed driveways. For these reasons, among others, it has
been considered sound and sensible in several states to place
a greater burden on the latter class of motorists.2 '
Yet the court was not writing on a clean slate, and it owed respect
to the legislative provision as interpreted by earlier courts:
In such situations in this jurisdiction, however, the rule
has been consistently followed that neither party has a statutory right of way and that 'each owed to the other the reciprocal duty to act reasonably.' [citing two earlier New Hampshire decisions] The Trial Court followed the statute as
written and never changed by the Legislature and as consistently construed in this state since the advent of the modern
motor vehicle. If a different rule should apply, it is in the
province of the Legislature to so provide by a statute of general application."
The judge's respect for precedent and the early common law
of New Hampshire is perhaps even more starkly demonstrated by
the wild boar case mentioned above, King v. Blue Mountain Forest
Association.'s Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court had
for many decades rejected efforts to inject strict liability principles
into the common law of torts, 4 it had adopted a strict liability rule
in an early line of cases for damage caused by trespassing livestock.2 5 The plaintiffs in King urged that this strict liability rule be
extended from livestock to cover wild boars, and Judge Kenison
felt constrained on the authority of the trespassing livestock cases
to broaden the coverage of strict liability in this context.
If a farmer who owns or possesses contented cows is held
to strict liability for trespass to real estate it would be a
strange doctrine that would not impose at least the same liability upon the owner of battering boar[s] which were im21. Id.
22.
23.
24.
liability

Id. at 445-56, 66 A.2d at 81.
100 N.H. 212, 123 A.2d 151 (1956).
Beginning most notably with Chief Justice Doe's famous opinion rejecting the strict
doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, in Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873). See W.

KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

78,

at 548 (5th ed. 1984); MacLeod, Chief Justice Kenison and the Law of Torts: A Comment
on Process, 48 B.U.L. REV. 175, 185-87 (1968); Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Reflections on
a Nineteenth Century Judge, 63 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1950).
25. See Noyes v. Colby, 30 N.H. 143 (1855); Kennett v. Durgin, 59 N.H. 560 (1880);
Blaisdell v. Stone, 60 N.H. 507 (1881).
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ported into the state for the purposes of exclusive and private
hunting.2 6
So, from respect for a long-established policy of former courts, and
in an effort to treat alike litigants of the same general type, Judge
Kenison extended an early common law strict liability rule that cut
of the court's long-standing aversion to
sharply across the grain
27
this form of liability.
Justice Kenison also respected the legal authority of trial
judges, judicial referees and masters. He forbade reference to the
trial courts as "lower" courts in internal memoranda,2 8 this reflected his view of their vital role as the principal judicial law-givers to the general citizenry-the connecting institution between
the law and the governed. His tort opinions bear witness to this
respect for the courts of first impression, particularly in the strong
presumption of correctness he accorded to findings and rulings of
such courts.2 9
While the jury may be located at the bottom of the judicial
organization chart, its key role as a source of law was firmly imbedded in Judge Kenison's judicial philosophy. Especially in the tort
law context, where many of the central issues are defined in terms
30
of "reasonableness"-of the defendant's conduct, in negligence;
of his land use, in nuisance 3 1-the law resides enormous discretion
in the jury to decide the liability and even damages issues almost
as it sees fit, often effectively beyond judicial review. Judge
Kenison respected this powerful role of the jury, acting in Jacksonian tradition for the wider community, in applying law to resolve
2
interpersonal disputes.1
26. 100 N.H. at 215, 123 A.2d at 154.
27. Within months of his retirement, Judge Kenison remained faithful to the state's
traditional opposition to strict liability, refusing to extend the doctrine to a ski area tramway operator. Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 570, 374 A.2d 1187, 1190
(1977): "We have not been prone to extend strict liability in this jurisdiction."
28. Discussion between Justice Kenison and author (August or September 1972). For
an example of his own use of the "trial court" denomination, see supra text accompanying
note 22.
29. See generally Lynch v. Bissell, 99 N.H. 473, 116 A.2d 121 (1955); Richards v.
Crocker, 108 N.H. 377, 236 A.2d 692 (1967); Lemery v. O'Shea Dennis, Inc., 112 N.H. 199,
291 A.2d 616 (1972).
30. E.g., Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
31. See generally Micucci v. White Mountain Trust Co., 114 N.H. 436, 321 A.2d 573
(1974); Robie v. Lillis, 112 N.H. 492, 299 A.2d 155 (1972) (non-jury hearing).
32. See Richards v. Crocker, 108 N.H. 377, 236 A.2d 692 (1967) (upholding compromise
verdict of jury).
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Two octogenarian-fall-down cases, Brosor v. Sullivan"3 and
Bernard v. Russell,34 demonstrated Judge Kenison's deference to
jury decision-making. In Brosor, the 83-year-old decedent slipped
on a scatter rug on a highly polished and waxed hardwood floor in
the defendant's residence,3 5 and in Bernard, the 82-year-old plaintiff was struck by the defendant's car while crossing the street.3 In
Brosor, Judge Kenison refused to follow certain other states which
hold as a matter of law that scatter rugs on polished floors are a
common risk that involves no negligence. Instead, he upheld a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, ruling that the question of the
homeowner's negligence was properly a jury question.3 7 In Bernard, the plaintiff appealed an adverse verdict, citing a number of
cases in which the plaintiff had prevailed on similar facts. Judge
Kenison observed as follows:
We recognize that plaintiffs have recovered verdicts in
cases like the present ....
However, uniformity in verdicts is
not a jewel in the crown of the jury system and the only thing
that the appellate court can do is to review the evidence to
see if the verdict is one that the jury is entitled to reach. 8
The Chief Justice let the verdict stand.
In addition to the common law of New Hampshire, Judge
Kenison looked abroad for guidance in the formulation and application of law. First, he looked to the law of other states. Not only
did Judge Kenison respect the applicability of other state law to
certain cases brought in New Hampshire courts under traditional
conflict of law principles,3 9 but his conflicts opinions were in the
national vanguard in adopting principles realistically identifying
the sovereign most legitimately concerned with the particular dispute.'0 Moreover, he turne frequently to the common law of other
states for guidance where the New Hampshire court had not considered an issue, or for corroboration or dialectical inquiry where it
33. 99 N.H. 305, 109 A.2d 862 (1954).
34. 103 N.H. 76, 164 A.2d 577 (1960).
35. 99 N.H. at 306, 109 A.2d at 863.
36. 103 N.H. at 76, 164 A.2d at 578. (N.H. Rep. states age is 82, A.2d states age is 79).
37. 99 N.H. at 306, 309, 109 A.2d at 863, 865.
38. 103 N.H. at 78, 164 A.2d at 579 (citations omitted).
39. Levlock v. Spanos, 101 N.H. 22, 131 A.2d 319 (1957) (law of Vermont, place of
automobile accident, governed question of whether wife's estate could sue husband's estate).
40. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), discussed infra in text
accompanying notes 151-58.
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had. In Associate Justice Kenison's first important torts opinion, 4'
in 1946, he relied on cases from New York and Massachusetts. Nor
did he grow parochial over the years. In his last torts opinion,'2 in
1977, the Chief Justice relied in part on cases from Kansas, Illinois,
Arkansas, Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Yet Judge Kenison well understood that the
Polar Star of any judge must be the welfare and law of the people
who vest him with his judicial powers. It thus was fitting that the
last case Judge Kenison cited in his last torts opinion was from
New Hampshire. 4 3 For one always must go home.
When the common law of New Hampshire and other states
was incomplete, fragmented, in disagreement, or just seemed
wrong, Judge Kenison often turned to "secondary" sources of the
law-legal commentary such as the various Restatements of the
law, the treatises (especially Prosser"4 and Harper & James), and
the law journals. His opinions are rich in citations, quotations, and
ideas from the judges, lawyers, and academics from around the
country who had studied similar problems and offered perspectives
that helped illuminate the way toward a just result. One senses
that he reaches out in this respect not only in a search for good
solutions to new problems, but also with an appreciation of New
Hampshire's symbiotic membership in a community of legal jurisdictions connected by many common threads of value and experience. Again, his first important torts opinion relied upon two treatises on automobile law, and upon the Restatement of Torts;45 his
last concluded with a quotation from Prosser on Torts and with a
reference to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.'
The legal commentators reciprocated. His opinions are frequently cited in the law journals 47 and treatises 48 as being leading
41. Clough v. Schwartz, 94 N.H. 138, 48 A.2d 921 (1946).
42. Paquette v. Joyce, 117 N.H. 832, 379 A.2d 207 (1977).
43. Id. at 837, 379 A.2d at 210.
44. See, e.g., Cook v. 177 Granite St., Inc., 95 N.H. 397, 399, 64 A.2d 327, 329 (1949)
(1st ed.); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 173, 121 A.2d 781, 782 (1956) (2d
ed.); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 109, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (1964) (3d ed.); Robie v.
Lillis, 112 N.H. 492, 495, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (1972) (4th ed.).
45. Clough v. Schwartz, 94 N.H. at 140, 48 A.2d at 922 (1946).
46. Paquette v. Joyce, 117 N.H. at 837, 379 A.2d at 210 (1977).
47. Among the many Kenison opinions noted in the law journals is Sargent v. Ross, 113
N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). The decision in this case formed the thesis for a major article
by Professor Jean Love and was noted in many law reviews. See Love, Landlord's Liability
for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wisc. L. REV.
19; Notes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1161 (1974); 1974 DuKE L.J. 175; 23 EMORY L.J. 1051 (1974); 2
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cases in various areas of tort law, and law students across the nation daily learn the law of torts by reading his opinions in the
casebooks.e Chief Justice Frank Rowe Kenison has become a significant part of this nation's common law.
II.

RESPECTING THE PURPOSES OF THE LAW

A judge shows the greatest respect for the sources of the law,
for the law-givers, by discerning and promoting the purposes behind the law. It is therefore only through "functional" analysis in
many cases that law can be applied intelligently and according to
the mandate of its sources. Although the search for policy objectives behind the rules is often fraught with difficulty, Judge
Kenison had a sharp insight into the social values and principles of
purpose that gave foundational support to the system of tort law
doctrine.
A threshold purpose of the law must be to afford persons holding grievances against one another reasonable access to the courts.
This principle is evident in Judge Kenison's opinions interpreting
statutory time limitations for tort claims, 50 particularly those conFORD URB. L.J. 647 (1974); 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1974); 8 SUFF. U.L. REV. 1305 (1974); 5 TEx.
TECH. L. REV. 887 (1974); 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 218 (1974); 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 510; 9 URB. L.
ANN. 259 (1975); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 3d 329 (1975). See also Browder, The Taming of a
Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99, 133 (1982) (referring to Sargent v. Ross as "[t~he leading case").
48. By way of example, Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, is discussed in
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 63, at 446, and in 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 27.16, 294, 295 (2d ed. 1986) ("it would appear that the forces of logic and
of history favor this reform and that it can be expected to spread").
49. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 174,
524 (6th ed. 1976) (Dorais v. Paquin, 113 N.H. 187, 304 A.2d 369 (1972); Sargent v. Ross,
113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973)); W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND SAFETY-CASES AND MATERIALS 862, 864 (1980) (Willett v. General Electric
Co., 113 N.H. 358, 306 A.2d 789 (1973); Workman v. Public Service Co., 113 N.H. 422, 308
A.2d 540 (1973)); H. SHULMAN, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 953 (3d ed. 1976) (Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1965)); L.
GREEN, W. PEDRICK, J. RAHL, E. THODE, C. HAWKINS, A. SMITH & J. TREECE, CASES ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 539 (2d ed. 1977) (Sargent, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528); G. CHRISTIE, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 532 (1983) (Sargent, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528); M.
FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 181 (3d ed.
1983) (Sargent, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528); D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS AND RELATED LAW 541, 641 (1980) (Sargent, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528);
Hamberger, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239); R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 551 (4th ed. 1984) (Sargent, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528).
50. See Ford v. Black Mountain Tramways, 110 N.H. 20, 259 A.2d 129 (1969) (60-day
notice of claim requirement in certain actions against ski areas); cf. Roy v. Roy, 101 N.H. 88,
133 A.2d 492 (1957) (action brought 15 years after accident; substitution of parties
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cerning the discovery rule. In Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co.,51 the
plaintiff had suffered injury to her eyes in 1968 from taking the
defendant's oral contraceptive. She discovered her possible claim
against the defendant manufacturer in 1970 or 1971 and filed suit
in 1975.52 The question was whether the 6-year statute of limitations began running from the date of her injury, and hence barred
the action, or whether the discovery rule (adopted earlier in the
medical malpractice context)53 tolled the running of the statute
until the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered her claim."
Extending the discovery rule to the products liability context,
Judge Kenison addressed the considerations behind the limitations
rule. For one thing, drug companies:
know or at least should expect that some time may pass
before the harmful effects of their products manifest themselves in drug users and that there may be another lapse of
time before the injured person is able to discover causal connection between his injury and the drug he consumed. 55
In addition, "unlike the situation in most cases, the passage of
time in a drug case is likely to increase both the amount and the
accuracy of the evidence. . .. ,,5"
And finally, the imposition of the
discovery rule should encourage manufacturers to marshal their resources to discover and remedy dangerous side-effects of their
drugs.5 The discovery rule thus was not unfair to defendants, and
was consistent with the underlying objectives of the statute, including the goal of discouraging victims from sleeping on their
rights:
[A] person cannot be said to have been 'sleeping on his rights'
when he does not know and reasonably could not have known
that he had such rights. By employing the discovery rule, we
avoid the harsh and illogical consequences of interpreting the
statute in a manner that outlaws the plaintiff's claim before
he was or should have been aware of its existence.5 8
permissible).
51. 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977).
52. Id. at 166, 371 A.2d at 172.
53. Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 A.2d 637 (1974).
54. 117 N.H. at 167, 371 A.2d at 172.
55. Id. at 174, 371 A.2d at 176.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 174, 371 A.2d at 176-77.
58. Id. at 170, 371 A.2d at 174 (citations omitted).
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Seven months later, in Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial
Hospital,5 Judge Kenison reaffirmed the importance of the objectives underlying the discovery rule. In that case, he reformulated
its definition, in conformance with its purposes, in terms of the
"discovery or a reasonable opportunity to discover the wrongful
nature of the defendants' conduct
.. "0 The rationale of Raymond was that one should not lose a legal right for failure to assert
it before he discovers he has suffered an injury; the rationale of
Brown was that one should not lose such a right before he discovers that he has a right to redress that injury in the courts.6 1
Once persons have entered the legal system, the rules applied
to resolve their disputes should be applied fairly and logically according to explicitly articulated values and policies of the jurisdiction. In his application of substantive tort law doctrine, Judge
Kenison employed just this type of functional approach, defining
the principles of tort law in terms of the purposes of a just society
that lay behind the law. If a dominant general principle is discoverable from his torts opinions, it may be that each person must, in
the pursuit of his own interests, show reasonable respect for the
interests of others. To Judge Kenison this meant, among other
things, that one must respect the basic dignity of other persons,
including the interest in privacy surrounding intimate aspects of
6 2 the defendant landlord hid
their lives. In Hamberger v. Eastman,
a listening and recording device beside the married plaintiffs' bed
that transmitted voices and other sounds to the landlord's house
next door. The tenants sued the landlord for invasion of privacy,
for intruding upon their physical and mental solitude and seclusion, a nascent tort in certain other states that had not before been
recognized in New Hampshire." Judge Kenison observed in part as
follows:
We have not searched for cases where the bedroom of
husband and wife has been 'bugged' but it should not be necessary-by way of understatement-to observe that this is
59. 117 N.H. 739, 378 A.2d 1138 (1977).
60. Id. at 743, 378 A.2d at 1140.
61. "A cause of action will not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered not only that he has been injured but also that
his injury may have been caused by the defendants' wrongful conduct." Id. (emphasis in
original).
62. 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964).
63. Id. at 109, 206 A.2d 239.
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the type of intrusion that would be offensive to any person of
ordinary sensibilities. What married 'people do in the privacy
of their bedrooms is their own business as long as they are
not hurting anyone else.'

If the peeping Tom, the big ear and the electronic eavesdropper (whether ingenious or ingenuous) have a place in the
hierarchy of social values, it ought not to be at the expense of
a married couple minding their own business in the seclusion
of their bedroom who have never asked for or by their conduct deserved a potential projection of their private conversations and actions to their landlord or to others.
• . .[T]he invasion of the plaintiffs' solitude or seclusion,
as alleged in the pleadings, was a violation of their right to
privacy and constituted a tort for which the plaintiffs may
recover damages, to the extent that they can prove them.
'Certainly, no right deserves greater protection .... ,64
Certainly there was no clearer judicial herald for providing tort law
protection against interpersonal invasions of privacy then Chief
Justice Kenison.
In addition to protecting the dignity and hence individuality
of persons, the law of torts protects the physical security of persons against unreasonable invasions by others. For more than
thirty years, in a large number of different contexts, Judge
Kenison defined and applied the negligence law duty of reasonable
care owed to others in the community and, through contributory
negligence doctrine, to oneself. His opinions reveal a balanced philosophy of tort responsibility, requiring potential injurers to accord
substantial respect to the safety of others, and requiring potential
injury victims to act responsibly for their own protection. The
standard of proper conduct Judge Kenison adopted was of course
the ubiquitous "reasonable man of ordinary prudence,"6 5 which he
further defined in traditional reasonableness, calculus of risk
terms:
General principles of tort law ordinarily impose liability
upon persons for injuries caused by their failure to exercise
64. Id. at 111-12, 206 A.2d at 241-42 (citations omitted).
65. E.g., Bernard v. Russell, 103 N.H. 76, 164 A.2d 577 (1960) (pedestrian struck by
automobile).
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reasonable care under all the circumstances. A person is generally negligent for exposing another to an unreasonable risk
of harm which foreseeably results in an injury."6

[A person] must act as a reasonable person under all
of'the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to
others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk. 7

Judge Kenison held these general principles applicable to
most types of persons in most types of contexts. So, his decisions
establish that due care must be exercised by motorists to enter the
highway cautiously, 6 to keep their eyes on the road, 69 and to clear
the windshield of ice and drive at prudent speeds on unfamiliar
roads; 70 by contractors to avoid creating unreasonable risks for
workers 7 1 and adjoining landowners; 72 by doctors treating patients; 73 by vendors of alcohol to intoxicated patrons; 7' and by
premises owners to provide lighting" or warning76 of darkened
stairways, to safely construct and maintain stairways," to secure
scatter rugs to slippery floors, 6 and to fence their high retaining
79

walls.

Judge Kenison's opinions also affirm the existence of a correlative obligation on the individual to act prudently to protect himself. Thus, a person must act with reasonable caution to avoid fall66. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 391, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (1973) (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
68. Owen v. DuBois, 95 N.H. 444, 66 A.2d 80 (1949); Naramore v. Putnam, 99 N.H. 175,
106 A.2d 568 (1954).
69. Roy v. Roy, 101 N.H. 88, 133 A.2d 492 (1957) (automobile guest statute: driver
turning to look at and talk to passenger in back seat as gross negligence).
70. McAllister v. Maltais, 102 N.H. 245, 154 A.2d 456 (1959) (auto guest statute: gross
negligence).
71. Butler v. King, 99 N.H. 150, 106 A.2d 385 (1954).
72. Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956).
73. See generally Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, 378 A.2d
1138 (1977).
74. See Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (violation of criminal statute as evidence of negligence).
75. Holmes v. Clear Weave Hosiery Stores, Inc., 95 N.H. 478, 66 A.2d 702 (1949).
76. Richards v. Crocker, 108 N.H. 377, 236 A.2d 692 (1967).
77. Filip v. Gagne, 104 N.H. 14, 177 A.2d 509 (1962); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308
A.2d 528 (1973).
78. Brosor v. Sullivan, 99 N.H. 305, 109 A.2d 862 (1954).
79. Wheeler v. Monadnock Community Hosp., 103 N.H. 306, 171 A.2d 23 (1961).
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ing down stairways, 80 slipping on ice, 81 crossing ctreets in front of
traffic, 2 sledding into traffic on a snow-covered street, 3 injuring
himself while intoxicated,8 4 walking on the wrong side of a snowcovered highway in dark clothing at night, 5 and driving off the
road into a tree stump.86 In most of these opinions, Judge Kenison
based his decision-sometimes explicitly, other times implicitly-on the fundamental social values and objectives that lay behind the rules of tort law. He was thus concerned with protecting
the parties' reasonable expectations of how other people will act,
and their expectations concerning other aspects of the apparent
safety or danger in a particular situation;87 with using the law instrumentally to encourage safe behavior; 8 with helping to assure
that all persons, including those with special limitations, are
treated and treat one another with respect; 9 and with assuring
compensation to persons injured by the heedless conduct of
80. See Rau v. First Nat. Stores, 97 N.H. 490, 92 A.2d 921 (1952).
81. See Cook v. 177 Granite St., Inc., 95 N.H. 397, 64 A.2d 327 (1949) (no duty: icy
condition obvious).
82. Bernard v. Russell, 103 N.H. 76, 164 A.2d 577 (1960).
83. Codding v. Makris, 104 N.H. 381, 187 A.2d 804 (1963).
84. Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (glass imbedded in wrist while
pounding fist on table).
85. Dorais v. Paquin, 113 N.H. 187, 304 A.2d 369 (1973).
86. Paquette v. Joyce, 117 N.H. 832, 379 A.2d 207 (1977).
87. See, e.g., Holmes v. Clear Weave Hosiery Stores, Inc., 95 N.H. 478, 66 A.2d 702
(1949) (customer, invited by clerk to dimly lit back room, fell down open stairway when
clerk told her to step back) (plaintiff "was directed by the defendant's agent to a place that
she had a right to expect to be safe"), id. at 480, 66 A.2d at 704. See also Butler v. King, 99
N.H. 150, 106 A.2d 385 (1954) (plaintiff leaned on porch railing which collapsed because
defendant contractor had removed supports) ("railing was level and stood upright and in
the same position [as] if it had been effectively secured at both ends . . . . [and] looked like
a normal railing [that] fit in tightly"), id. at 152, 106 A.2d at 387; Wheeler v. Monadnock
Community Hosp., 103 N.H. 306, 171 A.2d 23 (1961) (child fell over unfenced retaining wall
to lower level) ("There was no warning to this injured child and the retaining wall from the
side from which she approached it had the appearance of a low curb."), id. at 308, 171 A.2d
at 24.
88. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 399 A.2d 528 (1973) (tenant's child fell from
poorly constructed steps: liability rule "should help insure that a landlord will take
whatever precautions are reasonably necessary under the circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in his property"), id. at 399, 308 A.2d at 535; Raymond v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977) (burdens on defendant of discovery rule are
"justified if they cause the defendant to conform to a higher standard of care"), id. at 175,
371 A.2d at 177.
89. See generally Brosor v. Sullivan, 99 N.H. 305, 109 A.2d 862 (1954) (landlord should
have secured or removed scatter rug on polished hardwood floor in front of only door to
elderly tenant's bedroom, especially since he had slipped before); Hamberger v. Eastman,
106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) (landlord "bugged" tenants' bedroom).
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Although Judge Kenison's decisions hold the ordinary person
to a reasonably high standard of behavior, his opinions do not generally demand more of people than they can give. The tort law
goals of deterrence and punishment are generally out of place
where a defendant has acted as carefully as he is able, and society
usually loses more than it gains in terms of both freedom and efficiency when it forces individuals to shoulder the costs of accidents
they could not realistically prevent. Thus, he tempered the application of the stringent "prudent man" standard to conform to
some of the frailties of human life.
While this tempering of the normally high standard of prudence was most evident in cases involving young children injuring
themselves at play, " ' he also saw a proper allowance in the normal
standard for weaknesses in adults. This was certainly true for
adults with physical disabilities, including those resulting from old
age:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of behavior .... However, the standard has
been flexible enough in the case of aged and physically disabled persons to bend with the practical experiences of everyday life. The law does not demand that the blind shall see, or
the deaf shall hear, or that the aged shall maintain the traffic
agility of the young.92
He even acknowledged the possibility that an allowance should be
made for drunks: "We recognize that a drunken person is as much
entitled to protection as a sober one and much more in need of
it. "as
90. See generally Owen v. DuBois, 95 N.H. 444, 66 A.2d 80 (1949) (truck driver, who
may have been speeding and may have seen plaintiff long before collision smashed into
plaintiff's car); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (New Hampshire's ordinary rules of negligence preferable to automobile guest statute of another state; such statutes were enacted before advent of widespread liability insurance).
91. See Wheeler v. Monadnock Community Hosp., 103 N.H. 306, 171 A.2d 23 (1961);
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
92. Bernard v. Russell, 103 N.H. 76, 77, 164 A.2d 577, 578 (1960) (82-year-old plaintiff
pedestrian with cataract in one eye struck by defendant driver; jury properly considered
plaintiff's age and physical condition on contributory negligence). See also Brosor v. Sullivan, 99 N.H. 305, 109 A.2d 862 (1954).
93. Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 377, 211 A.2d 900, 901 (1965) (dictum) (citing
Robinson v. Pioche, Bayerque & Co., 5 Cal. 460, 461 (1855)).
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The Chief Justice also made more subtle allowances for lapses
in judgment by normal men and women in everyday life. In
Holmes v. Clear Weave Hosiery Stores,"' a shopper fell down a
stairway in a dark room at the back of the store while chattering
with the clerk over the color of a coat. Rendering judgement on the
verdict for the plaintiff, Judge Kenison remarked as follows on the
contributory negligence issue:
Plaintiff's conduct is to be considered in the light of the attendant circumstances and not in the abstract. She was unfamiliar with the layout of the back room and the position of
the stairs. Both she and the defendant's clerk were mutually
and respectively engrossed in the making of a sale and
purchase of a coat during a dispute as to the shade. When two
women are so engaged, it cannot be said as a matter of law
that the purchaser is negligent in failing to observe all the
details of5 the surroundings in a room into which she had been
9
invited.
A similarly keen and compassionate recognition of practicable
limitations on personal responsibility is evident in McAllister v.
Maltais.6 The defendant driver in that case was driving through a
sleet storm at 50-55 miles per hour without stopping to scrape the
windshield which had become glazed over with ice except for a
small and blurry "peephole" at the bottom. While negotiating a
curve, he ran the car off the road and into twin oak trees, injuring
his adult daughter, Cora.9 7 In the daughter's action against her father, the jury returned a verdict for the daughter, and Judge
Kenison reviewed the issue of whether she had been contributorily
negligent or assumed the risk in failing to protect herself from
harm:
At the time the danger arose, the plaintiff Cora was faced
not with legal theories, but facts. . . . First, she could not
have attempted to have used force on her father. We shall not
labor the point that all reasonable persons need not agree
that she should have done so. Again it is obviously not a compelled conclusion that she should have attempted to get out
of the moving car. There remains to consider whether all rea94. 95 N.H. 478, 66 A.2d 702 (1949).
95. Id. at 479-80, 66 A.2d at 703-04. See also Richards v. Crocker, 108 N.H. 377, 326
A.2d 692 (1967).
96. 102 N.H. 245, 154 A.2d 456 (1959).
97. Id. at 247, 154 A.2d at 458.
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sonable persons must agree that she should have made a more
violent protest to her father to stop and clear the windshielf
or let her take over the driving ....
The determination of these question requires a statement
of certain findable salient facts. It appears that Cora was a
woman who, although forty-five years old and married, had
spent much if not most of her life with her father and was at
that time living under the same roof with him. She respected
both his authority and his judgment. He, on the other hand,
was a strong-minded individual who, whether he should or
should not have done so, considered his daughter still 'a little
girl,' who was not to order him about, but who was to accept
his decisions. While this did not, of course, relieve her from
her duty to exercise ordinary care, it is a fact to be considered
in judging the reasonableness of her conduct toward her father on this occasion. He did not like back-seat or front-seat
driving and when, at other times, she had spoken to him
about his driving, 'He got mad.' Even on that day, although
he had to a degree heeded her first protest to slow down, he
had refused her request that he stop and clear the windshield
and replied that he would do so when he reached a filling station or a garage. To her further plea that she had a scraper in
the car, he responded by silence and continued on his way. It
appeared to her that storm signals were out and she testified
repeatedly that she believed it would have done no good to
argue or plead further, because 'He would still do what he
wanted to.' In effect, she made it clear that while she was disturbed and upset about his conduct, she did not know what
to do about it and said no more 'because I did not want to
make it any worse. ' 98

Judge Kenison sustained the verdict in Cora's favor, ruling that
the jury was entitled to conclude that her conduct should not bar
her from recovery. 9
In addition to the substantive objectives of tort law, based on
principles of safety and responsibility, Chief Justice Kenison's
opinions reveal a somewhat different form of legal ethic-that the
law should show no favorites, but should instead treat all parties
with equal respect, and that it should demand equal obedience to
its rules from all. One looks in vain in his opinions for bias toward
injurers or injureds, governmental units, corporations, rich or poor.
98. Id. at 250-51, 154 A.2d at 460-61.
99. Id. at 252, 154 A.2d at 461.
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Such preferences, both positive and negative, 1i1 deep within the
hearts of many persons, but of course should not control decisions
of an impartial judge.
Judge Kenison's tort opinions are illuminated by his evenhanded treatment of all parties that stood before the court. Landowners sometimes were held liable for an injury, 1' sometimes they
were not. 101 Sometimes the Boston and Maine railroad had to pay
in tort, 102 other times it did not.10 3 Little children10 4 and old men' 0 5
sometimes recovered for their injuries, at other times both young'0
and old' 0 took nothing on their claims. That the law held little
room for favorites in Judge Kenison's jurisprudence was evident in
his low regard for the traditional tort immunities from suit. 0 8
100. See, e.g., Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973) (young child fell from
dangerous stairway).
101. See, e.g., Paquette v. Joyce, 117 N.H. 832, 379 A.2d 207 (1977) (automobile drove
off road and into defendant's tree stump).
102. State v. Boston & Me. R.R., 99 N.H. 66, 105 A.2d 751 (1954) (fire started by defendant's locomotive; statute).
103. Beaudet v. Boston & Me. R.R., 101 N.H. 4,131 A.2d 65 (1957) (passenger missed a
step and fell while descending from train).
104. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973) (young child fell from
dangerous stairway); Wheeler v. Monadnock Community Hosp., 103 N.H. 306, 171 A.2d 23
(1961) (young child fell to lower level from unfenced retaining wall).
105. See Brosor v. Sullivan, 99 N.H. 305, 109 A.2d 862 (1954) (landlord failed to secure
scatter rug on slippery floor).
106. Codding v. Makris, 104 N.H. 381, 187 A.2d 804 (1963) (child sledding on streets hit
by car; statute).
107. See Rau v. First Nat. Stores, 97 N.H. 490, 92 A.2d 921 (1952) (elderly man fell
down stairway in nonpublic area at rear of store); Bernard v. Russell, 103 N.H. 76, 164 A.2d
577 (1960) (elderly man crossing street struck by car).
108. At issue was usually some limited form of immunity from the ordinary responsibility to act with due care. "In recent years, immunities from tort liability affording 'special
protection in some types of relationships have been steadily giving way' in this and other
jurisdictions." Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396, 308 A.2d 528, 533 (1973) (abolishing limited immunity of landlords). See also Hurley v. Town of Hudson, 112 N.H. 365, 296 A.2d
905 (1972) (criticizing "archaic and often inequitable doctrine of municipal tort immunity"),
id. at 367, 296 A.2d at 906; Ford v. Black Mountain Tramways, Inc., 110 N.H. 20, 259 A.2d
129 (1969) (60-day notice of claim statute construed to be inapplicable to claim); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (gross negligence standard of automobile guest
statute inferior to ordinary negligence standard); Filip v. Gagne, 104 N.H. 14, 177 A.2d 509
("There appears to be no reason or policy which would justify immunity of conservators
from liability for their own negligence in maintaining the estate of their wards."), id. at 16,
177 A.2d at 511; Wheeler v. Monadnock Community Hosp., 103 N.H. 306, 171 A.2d 23
(1961) (charitable immunity doctrine inapplicable in New Hampshire); Leary v. McSwiney,
103 N.H. 85, 166 A.2d 118 (1960) (state claims statute construed to permit claim by nonresident landowner whose property was damaged in crash of National Guard jet); Cnaeps v.
Brown, 101 N.H. 116, 135 A.2d 721 (1957) (statute requiring court approval of settlements
on behalf of minors did not shield infant from claims of persons injured by minor's negligence; purpose of statute was to protect his interests, "not to grant immunity from his own
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"Equality before the law" was the watchword of the judge.
The tort opinions of Chief Justice Kenison show a deep regard
for the purposes behind the law, and his application of specific
doctrine to resolve disputes was richly informed by an appreciation
of the social values from whence the doctrine sprang. And by this
type of enlightened functional analysis of the rules of law, he assured that the law would remain the servant of the citizens of New
Hampshire, rather than the other way around.
III.

RESPECTING THE LIMITS OF THE LAW

A mature understanding of and respect for law includes an appreciation of its limitations. Law would be reduced to tyranny, and
its purposes deprived of a vital dimension, if it were viewed one
dimensionally as a good. It is only the most insightful judge who
truly understands that law, like most everything known to man, is
an evil in excess. Although law must by nature move into the
human comedy from time to time to referee disputes between the
players, it should cut narrowly and precisely while inside and
should move out swiftly when the job is done. Since the job to be
accomplished can properly be defined only in terms of the purposes behind the law, a mature respect for the purposes of the law
includes a keen respect for its proper limits.
Deciding when to declare that a generally good rule of law
should go no further is often exceedingly difficult. There is much
less prescribed wisdom to guide the courts on why, when and how
to stop the law than on why, when and how to use it. There is
perhaps nothing that the judiciary can do to demonstrate more
emphatically its respect for the governed citizenry, who by constitution reserved to themselves their essential freedoms,' 0 9 than to
draw a bright line around the law containing it to its proper and
limited functions. Judge Kenison appreciated the limits of the law.
The problem of defining the limits of the law is ever present in
the law of torts, which seeks to resolve the inevitable clash of cornliabilities"), id. at 118, 135 A.2d at 723; Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121
A.2d 781 (1956) (majority rule terminating contractor's liability after completion and acceptance of work by owner rejected: "We adopt the view outlined by Prosser that independent building and construction contractors should be held to a general standard of reasonable care [toward endangered persons] even after acceptance of the work."), id. at 173, 121
A.2d at 782.
109. See N.H. CONST. part I, art. 1 & 2; U.S. CONST. amend. IX & X.
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peting interests of man as a social animal, since one man's freedom
is often another man's risk of harm. The law seeks, on the one
hand, to protect each person's freedom of action to advance his
own interests, as he defines them, until they interfere unreasonably
with the rights of others. From the opposing side, the law seeks to
protect each person's freedom of security in person, personality
and property from undue invasion by others.11 0 The Chief Justice
accommodated these ever-clashing interests with fairness and basic
logic tempered by a skeptical attitude toward the propriety of legal
intervention in the affairs of men.
The limits of the law began for Judge Kenison at the courthouse doors. As much a friend as he was to parties seeking access
to the courts for resolution of disputes, he imposed some limits on
the access rules. In Simoneau v. Town of Enfield,"' for example,
the plaintiff who was injured on a town bridge failed to file his
claim with the town within the 10-day limitation period required
by the notice of claim statute. The superior court granted him a 60
day extension for filing the claim, but he still neglected to file until
5 days after the extension period had ended. " 2 The superior court
dismissed his claim, and the supreme court affirmed. " s ,Judge
Kenison noted that the law was properly tolerant of failures to
meet the exceedingly short, initial 10-day time limitation on such
claims. There could be no excuse, however, for failing to file during
the grace period which offered a second opportunity to pursue his
claim."' Neither fairness nor logic supported providing such a
claimant with a "third bite at the litigation apple."' ' 5
Once claimants were within the common-law tort system, the
extent of their rights was to be determined according to the functions served by the tort law rules. An excellent example of this
perspective is Judge Kenison's astute opinion in Dorais v. Paquin," an action by a 17-year-old pedestrian struck by a car. The
plaintiff was walking to work along the right-hand side of the highway, in the roadway because snowbanks covered both sides of the
110. "When men enter into a state of society, they surrender up some of their natural
N.H. CONST. part I,
rights to that society, in order to insure the protection of others .
art. 3.
111. 112 N.H. 242, 293 A.2d 317 (1972).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 243, 293 A.2d at 318.
115. Id.
116. 113 N.H. 187, 304 A.2d 369 (1973).
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road.1 7 The defendant driver dimmed her headlights upon the approach of another car and first saw the plaintiff when she turned
her high beams back on just before hitting the plaintiff. The trial
judge submitted both the negligence and contributory negligence
issues to the jury which returned a verdict for the driver." 8 On
appeal, the pedestrian claimed that the trial judge had erred in
failing to instruct the jury that she was only to be held to a standard of care of a child of like age, experience and knowledge." 9
The question before the court therefore was whether a 17-year-old
teenager was entitled to be judged according to the traditional
standard of care for children.' 20 The Chief Justice went straight to
the rationale for the special rule for children:
The fundamental reason for measuring a child's conduct
by a varying child standard instead of the reasonable prudent
man standard derives from the basic unfairness of predicating
legal fault upon a standard which most children are simply
incapable of meeting. Children generally do not have the
same capacity to perceive, appreciate and avoid dangerous
situations which is possessed by the ordinary, prudent
adult."'1
So it is a child's immaturity of judgement and physical skills,
not his status as a minor, that entitles him to a lowered standard
of prudent behavior. Yet, the 17-year-old plaintiff failed to introduce evidence at trial "showing that she was any less able than an
adult to appreciate the risk of walking along the wrong side of the
road clad in dark clothing without a light under dark and icy conditions.' 12 2 Rejecting the plaintiff's argument equating "children"
with "minors, 1 23 Judge Kenison adopted a flexible standard functionally defining the limits to the special child rule:
There is no fixed age in this State when 'infants' are touched
with the legal wand and suddenly bound to exercise the same
degree of care as adults.
Once a youth's intelligence, experience and judgment ma117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 188, 304 A.2d at 370.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 189, 304 A.2d at 371.
Id. at 188, 304 A.2d at 371.
Id. at 189, 304 A.2d at 371.
Id.
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ture to the point where his capacity to perceive, appreciate
and avoid situations involving an unreasonable risk of harm
to himself or others approximates the capacity of an adult,
the youth will be held to the adult standard of care.
The closer a child comes to majority, and the more common and obvious the risk, the more likely it is that the youth
will be held to the adult standard of care. See Laws 1973, Ch.
72 lowering the age of majority to eighteen. It will be infrequent that a 17-year-old will not be held to an adult standard
of care .. [T]he plaintiff in this case had substantially an
adult capacity to appreciate the obvious risk of walking on
the wrong side of the road under 1dark
and icy conditions in
24
dark clothing and without a light.
Whatever may have been his attitude toward the all-or-nothing
rule of contributory negligence, later abandoned by the New
Hampshire legislature,125 Judge Kenison masterfully defined the
scope of the special child standard of care in terms of its
objectives.
The Chief Justice employed the same functional analytical
technique in Paquette v. Joyce. 26 The passenger in a car was injured when a driver failed to negotiate a turn, drove up onto the
defendant's property and crashed into a 3 foot high tree stump
that the defendants had converted into a decorative planter after
they had cut down the tree.12 7 Landowners were liable under New
Hampshire law for creating or maintaining artificial-but not natural-conditions that involved foreseeable and unreasonable risks
to travellers who deviated foreseeably from the highway.1 28 The
plaintiff therefore argued that the defendants had converted a
"natural" condition into an "artificial" one when they cut down
the tree and left the stump. 2 9 In an opinion affirming the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim, Judge Kenison rejected the
plaintiff's attempt to extend the artificial condition rule of liability
to include tree stamps. 3 0 "The tree stump had no greater propensity to cause harm to users of the highway in the ordinary course of
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 190-91, 304 A.2d at 372 (citations omitted).
See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1970).
117 N.H. 832, 379 A.2d 207 (1977).
Id. at 834, 379 A.2d at 208.
Id. at 835, 379 A.2d at 209.
Id.
Id.

1986]

Chief Justice Frank Rowe Kenison

travel than did the tree."' 3 ' Nor would an argument be tenable
that the defendants had reduced the visibility of the hazard by
cutting down the tree:
But even assuming that the object now became less visible,
this would not contribute to its propensity to cause harm.
The stump was not hazardous because it presented a hidden
trap to those who stray from the highways. It was dangerous
only to travellers six feet off the highway encountering it at
sufficient speed to be injured by the impact, to whom the diminished visibility of the object would in most cases be irrelevant. We are not prepared to say that the defendants' conduct introduced a risk that was appreciable enough to be
foreseen and that would give rise to a duty to avoid."3 2
When claimants could not prove negligence, they sometimes
sought recovery on strict liability. Yet the judicial tradition in New
Hampshire against extending the limited pockets of this form of
liability is deeply rooted in the past. Chief Justice Kenison, concerned that the law not demand more of people than their capabilities, so as to enable them to conform their conduct to the law,
continued throughout his career to maintain the state's skeptical
judicial attitude toward strict tort liability. In the case involving
property damage from wild boars,13 3 the court was asked to adopt
the Restatement's strict liability rule of damage caused by wild animals. Judge Kenison reasoned as follows:
An examination of the cases in this state definitely indicate a clear tendency to limit strict liability to those cases
where the Legislature has provided for it or to those situations where the common law of the state has imposed such
liability and the Legislature has not seen fit to change it. In
the leading case of Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was entirely repudiated

. . .

and

there has been no indication that, apart from statute, strict
liability would be imposed in cases involving blasting or in
cases involving dangerous domestic animals. .

.

. In view of

the consistent policy evidenced by an unbroken line of decisions in this state which, with the exception of cases of cattle
trespass to real estate, impose liability at common law for
131. Id.
132. Id. at 836, 379 A.2d at 209 (citations omitted).
133. King v. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, 100 N.H. 212, 123 A.2d 151 (1956); see supra
text accompanying notes 16-19.
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negligence only, we do not now adopt a rule of absolute liability for injuries to persons and property
caused by wild ani34
mals, as a generous principle of law.'
In this third torts opinion, 136 within months of going on the
court in 1946, Judge Kenison refused to apply the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence that would have held a fireman riding on a fire truck strictly responsible for the negligence of the
driver. In his third to last torts opinion,' within months of leaving the court in 1977, he refused to impose strict tort liability on a
ski area operator for the death of a boy who fell from a tramway:
"We have not been prone to extend strict liability in this jurisdiction."1 37 In between these two decisions, he refused to replace negligence law with strict liability in cases involving claims of imputed
negligence from a bailee to a bailor, 3 8 damages caused by wild animals,1 39 and injuries to a passenger departing from a common
carrier. 4 0
One of Judge Kenison's most elegant tort opinions is Robie v.
Lillis,1 a nuisance action. This case demonstrates more than most
the Chief Justice's sensitivity to the inherent trade-offs in a dynamic society where productive activity involves inevitable harm to
others. He appreciated the importance of carefully drawing the
line between allowable freedom of action, on the one hand, and
security from harm, on the other, so as to prevent the law from
intruding too deeply into social intercourse. The defendant in Robie built an aluminum boat storage shed on its 4-acre tract of land
in an unzoned, rural area near Lake Winnipesaukee. 42 Plaintiffs
sought to have it removed, claiming that "the existence and operation of the boathouse constitute a nuisance because the shed is the
first and only commercial structure in what is otherwise a quiet,
rural and residential area and that it is a blight upon the otherwise
unscarred landscape" that would depreciate the value of their
properties.1 43
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 216-17, 123 A.2d at 155 (citations omitted).
Clough v. Schwartz, 94 N.H. 138, 48 A.2d 921 (1946).
Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977).
Id. at 569, 374 A.2d at 1187.
Lynch v. Bissell, 99 N.H. 473, 116 A.2d 121 (1955).
King v. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, 100 N.H. 212, 123 A.2d 151 (1956).
Beaudet v. Boston & Me. R.R., 101 N.H. 4, 131 A.2d 65 (1957).
112 N.H. 492, 299 A.2d 155 (1972).
Id. at 493, 299 A.2d at 157.
Id. at 493-94, 299 A.2d at 157.
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New Hampshire law defined a private nuisance as an activity
that results in a substantial and unreasonable interference with the
use and enjoyment of another's property.'4 4 Judge Kenison quoted
approvingly from the comments to the Second Restatement of
Torts:
'Life in organized society .

.

. involves an unavoidable clash

of individual interests. Practically all human activities . . .
interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of
interference ....

[E]ach individual in a community must put

up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and
interference, and must take a certain amount of risk in order
that all may get on together. . . . The law of torts does not
attempt to impose liability . . . in every case where one per-

son's conduct has some detrimental effect on another. Liability is imposed only in those cases where the harm or risk to
one is greater than he ought to be required to bear under the
circumstances

....

[T]he law ...

requires that an inten-

tional invasion
be unreasonable before one is liable for caus5
4
ing it."

Ruling that the shed was not sufficiently unsightly to require its
destruction, and noting that the courts cannot generally protect
landowners from changes in the market values of their properties,
Judge Kenison indicated that the risk of commercial construction
in sparsely populated, unzoned areas is a normal risk of ownership
of such land. 1 46 He concluded his analysis as follows:

Plaintiffs urge that in this day of increased ecological
concern we should broaden the existing boundaries of the law
of nuisance to fill in the gap where environmental and zoning
legislation leaves off. We are of the opinion, however, that the
traditional nuisance analysis performs just that function admirably well and would be exceptionally difficult to improve
upon ....

[T]he present rules which resolve conflicting land

uses upon an analysis of the unreasonableness and substantiality of a person's interference with another's rights are flexible, equitable and well adapted to the problem. When plaintiffs fail to obtain relief as in the instant case, it is because
the interference complained of has not been shown to be substantial or unreasonable under all of the circumstances. It
144.
145.
g (Tent.
146.

Id. at 495, 299 A.2d at 158.
Id. at 496, 299 A.2d at 159 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 comment
Draft No. 17, 1971)).
Id. at 498, 299 A.2d at 160.
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does not appear unreasonable to us to locate a boat storage
shed on a four-acre tract of land in a rural albeit 'residential'
locality which depends in part for its economic livelihood on
boating and other recreational activities.47
Yet Judge Kenison's keen appreciation for the importance of
defining proper limits of the law did not mean that he viewed the
law as static. To the contrary, when legal doctrine grew weary and
wooden for modern life, he saw the necessity of expanding the
boundaries to keep the doctrine current with changing social conditions. Two of his most famous tort decisions, Clark v. Clark'"
and Sargent v. Ross, 4 e made significant alterations in existing doctrine to conform it to modern society and scholarly thought. Both
cases have been the subject of substantial commentary in treatises,
casebooks and law journals5 0 across the nation and so will not be
examined closely here. Yet no discussion of Chief Justice Kenison's
contributions to tort law would be complete without some mention
of both cases, and so they will be considered briefly as demonstrative of his willingness when necessary to expand the boundaries of
the law of torts.
The problem in Clark was a procedural one of determining
whether to apply the tort law of Vermont or of New Hampshire to
an automobile accident involving New Hampshire residents driving
in Vermont.15 1 The driver husband was sued by his passenger wife
in New Hampshire for negligence in operating the car. Vermont,
but not New Hampshire, had an automobile guest statute requiring that the guest prove "gross and willful negligence" by the host
147. Id. at 499, 299 A.2d at 161.
148. 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
149. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
150. The attention given to Clark v. Clark-generally viewed as a conflicts rather than
a torts case-by a leading conflicts scholar, Professor Leflar, see supra note 5, is typical of
the substantial scholarly praise that the decision continues to receive. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, L.
McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (4th ed. 1987) (forthcoming); R. LEFLAR, L. McDOUGAL & R. FELIX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 16
(1982); Leflar, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 721, 728 (1979); Leflar, True
"False Conflicts," Et Alia, 48 B.U.L. REv. 164 (1968): "Among Conflict of Laws students
Chief Justice Frank R. Kenison has come to be known as one of the nation's outstanding
judicial scholars, largely by reason of ...

Clark v. Clark. Clark ...

became almost at once

a leading case, widely noted in the law reviews, much cited and relied upon in subsequent
judicial opinions in other states, and likely to be reprinted in any Conflicts casebook that
may be published soon." (citations omitted) Id. at 164. For scholarship on Sargent v. Ross,
see supra notes 47-49.

151. 107 N.H. at 352, 222 A.2d at 207.
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driver in order to recover. 5 ' The traditional choice of law rule in
cases of this type was to apply the law of the place where the injury occurred. Judge Kenison noted the unanimity of scholarly opposition to the place of injury rule, and observed that its single
virtue-that it was easy to apply-existed only because it was a
mechanical rule. "It bore no relationship to any relevant consideration for choosing one law as against another in a torts-conflicts
case."' 53 He rejected the alternative analytical technique of
"recharacterizing" the problem from tort to family law, procedural
law or some other legal category. "This court prefers not to rely on
such a technique because it overlooks policy considerations that
should underlie choice of law adjudication.' 54 He therefore replaced the place-of-the-wrong-rule with a dynamic analytical approach that examined "the relevant choice of law considerations,"
including the predictability of results, maintenance of good interstate relations, simplification of the judicial task, pursuit of the forum state's governmental interests, and favoring the better rule of
law.1 55 As for the latter, Judge Kenison remarked:
We prefer to apply the better rule of law in conflicts cases,
.. . when the choice is open to us. If the law of some other
state is outmoded, an unrepealed remnant of a bygone age, 'a
drag on the coattails of civilization,' we will try to see our way
clear to apply our own law instead. If it is our own law that is
obsolete or senseless
(and it could be) we will try to apply the
156
other state's law.
Judge Kenison reasoned that the relationship between the spouses,
and the risk that they might collude to obtain insurance from the
husband's liability carrier, were both of legitimate concern only to
New Hampshire courts. 5 7 Since the ordinary negligence doctrine
of New Hampshire, moreover, was a better rule than Vermont's
standard of gross negligence, he concluded that the relevant
choice-influencing considerations compelled the application of New
58
Hampshire law to the tort action between the spouses.
Chief Justice Kenison was also willing to expand the existing
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 351, 271 A.2d at 207.
107 N.H. at 352, 222 A.2d at 207.
Id. at 353, 222 A.2d at 208.
Id. at 354, 222 A.2d at 208.
Id. at 355, 222 A.2d at 209 (citations omitted).
Id. at 356, 222 A.2d at 209.
Id. at 357, 222 A.2d at 210.
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limits of legal doctrine in the substantive law of torts. Sargent v.
Ross 15 was undoubtedly his most significant doctrinal contribution
to tort law. This was an action against the landlord of a residential
building with an outdoor stairway from which the plaintiff's 4year-old daughter fell to her death. The upstairs tenant, whose
apartment was serviced by the stairway, was babysitting the child
at the time of the fall. 160 There was no apparent cause of the accident except that the stairs were dangerously steep and that the
railing was insufficient to prevent a child from falling over the
side. ' In the mother's suit against the babysitter for negligent supervision and against the landlord for negligent construction and
maintenance of the stairway, the jury returned verdicts for the babysitter and for the plaintiff on her claim against the landlord. The
landlord appealed, relying upon "the general rule which has long
obtained in this and most other jurisdiction that a landlord is not
liable, except in certain limited situations, for injuries caused by
defective or dangerous conditions in the leased premises. 1162
Rather than confront head-on the entrenched general rule of nonliability, the plaintiff contended that the case fell within one or
more exceptions to the no-duty rule: specifically, that the landlord
had retained control over the stairway, that the addition of the
stairway to the building several years before had been a negligent
repair of the premises, or that the dangerous condition of the stair63
way was a concealed defect in the premises.
Noting that the landlord's tort immunity was a form of
"'quasi-sovereignty' " that found "its source in an agrarian England of the dark ages," Judge Kenison found the "untoward favoritism of the law for landlords" repugnant to modern notions of justice.' 6 ' The court was thus compelled to re-evaluate the landlord
tort immunity rule in its entirety "where we are asked either to
apply the rule, and hold the landlord harmless for a foreseeable
death resulting from an act of negligence, or to broaden one of the
existing exceptions and hence perpetuate an artificial and illogical
rule."' 6 5 Judge Kenison summarized the problem as follows:
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
Id. at 390, 308 A.2d at 530.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 390-91, 308 A.2d at 530.
Id. at 391, 308 A.2d at 530.
Id. at 392, 308 A.2d at 531.
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The anomaly of the general rule of landlord tort immunity
and the inflexibility of the standard exceptions, such as the
control exception, is pointedly demonstrated by this case. A
child is killed by a dangerous condition of the premises. Both
husband and wife tenants testify that they could no nothing
to remedy the defect because they did not own the house nor
have authority to alter the defect. But the landlord claims
that she should not be liable because the stairs were not
under her control. Both of these contentions are premised on
the theory that the other party should be responsible. So the
orthodox analysis would leave us with neither landlord nor
tenant responsible for dangerous conditions on the premises.
This would be both illogical and intolerable, particularly since
neither party then would have any legal reason to remedy or
take precautionary measures with respect to dangerous
conditions. '66

The control test was insufficient because "it substitute[d] a facile
and conclusive test for a reasoned consideration of whether due
care was exercised under all the circumstances."I 6 7 The concealed
defect and negligent repair exceptions could both be stretched to
cover the facts, but Judge Kenison thought that a more forthright
solution was in order: "We think that now is the time for the landlord's limited tort immunity to be relegated to the history books
where it more properly belongs."'
Turning the ancient no-duty
rule on its head, Chief Justice Kenison remarked:
[W~e today discard the rule of 'caveat lessee' and the
doctrine of landlord nonliability in tort to which it gave
birth. . . .Henceforth, landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unreasonable
risk of harm. . . .The questions of control, hidden defects
and common or public use, which formerly had to be established as a prerequisite to even considering the negligence of
a landlord, will now be relevant only inasmuch as they bear
on the basic tort issues such as the foreseeability and unreasonableness of the particular risk of harm.

Our decisions will shift the primary focus of inquiry for
judge and jury from the traditional question of 'Who had con166. Id. at 393-94, 308 A.2d at 532.

167. Id. at 393, 308 A.2d at 531.
168. Id. at 396, 308 A.2d at 533.
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trol?' to a determination of whether the landlord and the injured party exercised due care under all the circumstances.
Perhaps even more significantly, the ordinary negligence standard should help insure that a landlord will take whatever
precautions are reasonably necessary under the circumstances
to reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in his
property.

69

Although the decision had radically altered the principles of landlord tort law that had been developed and applied in New Hampshire back into the mists of time, Judge Kenison was confident
that the time for change had arrived. "The abiding respect of this
court for precedent and stability in the law is balanced by an appreciation of the need for responsible growth and change in rules
that have failed to keep pace with modern developments in social
and juridical thought." 17 0 The rule of Sargent v. Ross has been
praised by the scholars1 7 1 as it has spread across the land.1 72 Chief
Justice Kenison's general philosophy of restraint toward the reach
of law thus allowed for the expansion of its limits when required
by the public good.
CONCLUSION

The study of Chief Justice Kenison's tort law opinions provides several gems of insight into his judicial legacy. For over
thirty years, he touched the law confidently but gently, with a fitting respect for the proudly independent people of New Hampshire. During four decades he used the law of torts, derived from
many sources but rooted ultimately in the citizens of the state, to
help the people rule themselves. He was scrupulous in his efforts to
assure that the tort law rules were fair and reasonable both in their
conception and their application. Each time he applied tort doctrine to a new dispute, he nurtured and enriched the law, snipping
and pruning when necessary for its health and then only with studied care.
169. Id. at 397-99, 308 A.2d at 534-35 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534.
171. See supra note 47 and infra note 172.
172. Wisconsin followed Sargent v. Ross in 1979, Massachusetts in 1980, Florida in
1981, Idaho in 1984, Nevada in 1985. See 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 27.16 at 294-95 (2d ed. 1986); Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 339 § 4 (1975). California followed Sargent v. Ross in Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973) but refused to admit it. See also, Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah
1981). M.F. McNAMARA, 2,000 FAMOUS LEGAL QUOTATIONS 327 (1967).
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For over thirty years, Judge Kenison's service on his state's
high court reflected a deep and abiding respect for the sources, for
the purposes, and for the limits of the law. In the process, he
honored the people of New Hampshire whose protection and enhancement is the driving purpose behind the law, and for whose
benefit the law is contained within proper limits.
Another lawyer in New Hampshire's proud legal history,
Daniel Webster, observed as follows, at the funeral of Mr. Justice
Story, nearly a century and a half ago:
Justice Sir, is the greatest interest of man on earth. It is
the ligament which holds civilized beings and civilized nations
together. Wherever her temple stands, and so long as it is
duly honored, there is a foundation for social security, general
happiness and the improvement and progress of our race.
And whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness and distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august
dome still higher in the skies, connects himself, in name and
fame and character, with that which is and must be as durable as the frame of human society.'7
Chief Justice Frank Rowe Kenison of New Hampshire, for over
thirty years, so labored on the law with great distinction. His legacy will endure for so long as the law still stands protecting the
citizens of New Hampshire and the nation.

173. The oration was delivered on September 12, 1845. Daniel Webster died seven years
later, one hundred years before Frank Kenison was appointed Chief Justice of New Hampshire in 1952. The Boy Scouts of America, in 1975, conferred upon Chief Justice Kenison
the Daniel Webster Distinguished Citizen Award.

